This paper reviews the macroeconomic policy of Korea before and after the recent crisis and thoroughly evaluates the effects of fiscal and monetary policies implemented to cope with the crisis. Before the crisis, Korea's overall macroeconomic policy stance appeared to be contractionary. However, it can be assessed that, given the increased short-term liquidity through the massive inflow of foreign capital, the upward adjustment of domestic interest rate was not enough to be effective to alleviate the upward pressure of asset prices in Korea. After the crisis, the fiscal stimulus had significantly contributed to buffering the negative impact of the crisis in the first half of 2009, successfully playing its pump-priming role. Meanwhile, proactive monetary policy response along with strong fiscal stimulus also contributed to recovery of the Korean economy, though concern on its potential side effects such as asset market bubbles and fast inflation have been growing. Meanwhile, a certain degree of international cooperation may be required when policy stances are changed to exit from the crisis, specific exit strategies could be different depending on the country, in terms of the implementation time and scale.
The Korean economy seems to be successfully bottoming out from the recession triggered by the global financial crisis, and the recovery pace is faster than anticipated. The recovery of the Korean economy within a year of the crisis has been assessed to be remarkably positive at home and abroad, and now the economy appears to enter into the stabilization phase, normalizing its recovery pace. It is obvious that the recovery is based on stabilization of the global financial market and improvement of the world trade environment as each country implemented the unprecedented expansionary policies to respond to the recession. On the domestic side, the enhanced capacity to respond to the crisis of each sector resulting from restructuring, which was carried out steadily since the financial crisis in the late 1990s, prevented the recession to be dragged on. In addition, the economists at home and abroad, along with international organizations like the IMF and OECD, invariably appreciate that the Korean government's comprehensive and timely implementation of policies have contributed to the faster than expected recovery. This paper reviews the macroeconomic policy in Korea before and after the recent crisis and thoroughly evaluates the effects of fiscal and monetary policies implemented to cope with the crisis. However, it would not be possible to make the complete assessment at this time as it is too early to conduct analysis on the fundamental changes of the Korean economy and to accurately scrutinize questions such as whether the private sector is completely recovered or whether the potential growth rate of the Korean economy is lowered by the crisis. Therefore, this paper is a preliminary study or a general overview of the consequences of global financial crisis and Korea's policy responses.
Taking into account these limitations, Chapter 2 of this paper reviews the Korean economy before the outbreak of the 2008 crisis and its policy environment. Chapter 3 provides an overview of policy responses of the Korean government during the crisis, and assesses the impact of fiscal stimulus on GDP growth rates, followed by a brief assessment of the Bank of Korea's monetary policy of super-low interest rate. Chapter 4 concludes focusing on the exit from the recent crisis and implications for future policy directions. Korea: 2005 Korea: -2007 The Accordingly, as a stable growth pattern emerged from a balanced improvement in exports and domestic demand, Korea's overall macroeconomic policy stance appeared to be normalized.
II. Policy Environment before the Crisis

A. Macroeconomic Trends and Policies in
Above all, the fiscal policy was set to keep the consolidated government budget in balance over the business cycle ensuring the proper functioning of its automatic stabilizing role. In particular, fiscal expenditure had been curbed so that the favorable condition of tax revenue in such a well performing economy in 2007 would lead to the long-run fiscal soundness. The analysis using fiscal impulse as in Figure 1 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 increase in revenue increase in expenditure FI (%) Notes: FI (fiscal impulse) is a measure to compute the changing impact of the budget stance of the economy with business cycle adjustment. The FI indicator implies that the fiscal policy stance of current year is expansionary (contractionary) compared to that of previous year when it is computed as positive (negative).
The monetary policy of Korea also had been implemented in a way to reduce the degree of accommodation gradually even before 2006, in response to the trend toward improvement of the real economy. The Bank of Korea undertook a five-step upward adjustment of the call rate target, by 25 basis points at each step, from October 2005 to August 2006. The raising of call rate target in this way was intended to gradually eliminate the side-effects arising from the past period of continual low interest rates, as well as preemptively counter the upward pressures on prices driven by the sharp run-up in oil prices. In 2007, as inflation pressure from aggregate demand were growing, the Bank of Korea raised the target rate by 50 basis points to 5.0%. Meanwhile, limiting its foreign exchange market intervention, the Korean authorities maintained the foreign exchange policy stance allowing the won's exchange rate to be determined flexibly by the supply and demand condition of the foreign exchange market.
1 Such flexibility in exchange rate and resulted appreciation of won served to buffer the impacts of changes in external conditions on domestic economy and to establish independent monetary policy for macroeconomic stability of Korea. In other words, the continued appreciation of Korean won until 2007 was a result of large inflow of foreign capital in the flexible exchange 1 Despite the continued weakening of the dollar since 2003, the Korean government took actions to maintain the won's value at a low level. Then, in the fourth quarter of 2004, the won recorded a significant appreciation and export companies called for government intervention in the foreign exchange market. However, the government was already under increased pressure for handling the cost to sustain the overly accumulated foreign exchange reserve which was at that time even larger than Korea's total debt, so there was not much room for the government to initiate active policies on foreign exchange policies.
rate system, and it also played the role of limiting additional expansion of foreign exchange liquidity. Korea: 2005 Korea: -2007 Several recent studies on the global financial crisis pointed out that expansionary monetary policy of advanced economies, particularly in the US after the IT bubble burst, as the main culprit behind the crisis. 3 In particular, the low interest rate policy that has prevailed for a long period of time to respond to economic slowdown after the IT bubble burst left investors with appetite for high risk products, giving rise to high-risk investment and also encouraging these products to be distributed widely, which eventually heightened the risks in the financial sector, according to the studies. The low interest rate policy also has been accused as a major factor that contributed to forming house price bubbles combined with insufficient financial supervision and inadequate credit rating on the spread of investment products related to housing finance. These bubbles burst in the end, throwing global financial markets and world economies into the crisis of severe credit crunch and economic slowdown.
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B. Asset Prices and Financial Markets in
Korea, as well, maintained expansionary stance for the monetary policy as a way to respond to economic slowdown after the economic crisis of the late 1990s and IT bubble burst of advanced economies, which resulted in a rapid expansion in household credit and sharp rise in house prices. In this context, Korea appears to have experienced negative effects of monetary policy as advanced economies did. In other words, in Korea, as well, excessive liquidity had acted as an underlying factor behind the surge in house prices. However, it should be noted that Korea already went through a burst of household credit bubble in 2003 and the ensuing economic contraction. Also, the size of the monetary policy expansion and the house price growth was relatively smaller in Korea than the US and Europe, the epicenter of the recent crisis.
2 Considering the fact that the increased supply of foreign exchange was largely through the increase in short-term borrowings, it is, of course, naïve or incorrect to argue that the Korean government's foreign exchange policy posed no problems. The rapid increase in short-term external liability was a main culprit that caused a large and abrupt outflow and subsequent sharp depreciation of Korean won, rapidly infecting the Korean economy with the global financial crisis.
For this reason, it might be reasonable to argue that conditions and consequences of the monetary policy naturally turned out very differently in Korea. For the output gap, I use the aggregate demand pressure that can be extracted from the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) methodology of Blanchard and Quah (1989) as reported in Kim (1996) for the Korean data. The most critical identification assumption of this methodology is that the demand shock does not change the output level in the long run, while the supply shock does. I used the seasonally adjusted quarterly series of GDP and core consumer price index (core CPI) with eight lags included in the reduced form estimation, and the sample Figure 7 indicates that the faster the M1's year-on-year growth rate grows above the nominal GDP growth rate, the higher the asset prices tend to rise. M1 is mainly the funds of the household and corporate sectors which need to be operated in the short-term. In other words, in the case where M1 grows much faster than that caused by the fluctuations of real economic activity, there would be an increase in the wandering short-term liquidity-which refers to the liquidity to move fast towards seemingly more profitable investment opportunities emerging in certain asset markets. For example, in the period where Korea's monetary policy was being eased excessively after the economic crisis of the late 1990s, the short-term liquidity in non-financial private sector rose much faster than real 6 This could be due to that under the inflation targeting, the Bank of Korea was more responsive to current inflation than to the expected inflation for the future. I estimated the Bank of Korea's target rate response equation using the year-on-year percentage growth of the CPI, the aggregate demand pressure, and the real effective exchange rate (REER). For the REER, I constructed an index that is based on twelve currencies of major trading partners of the Korean economy, using the relative portion of trading volumes as the respective currencies' weights. In order to eliminate the significant serial correlation of error term, I
included the lagged dependent variable. According to the regression results, it seems that the call rate target set by the Bank of Korea was intended to stabilize output as well as inflation and also to directly respond to changes in the foreign exchange rate. The result also suggests that the target call rate responded significantly to the realized inflation rate, but insignificantly to the inflation rate of the next year. This implies that the Bank of Korea did not change the call rate in response to an expected call rate in a preemptive manner.
economic activity and was flown into stock and housing markets, raising asset prices at a rapid pace. This trend might have continued on in mid-2000s. I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I   2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 The increased liquidity from the foreign capital inflow through short-term borrowing might have been invested in non-traditional short-term financial investment products such as CDs of banks and money market fund (MMF) of non-bank financial institutions whose return used to be higher than that of traditional products.
8 As these investment products are not included in M1, it is possible that the rise and fall in M1 might not clearly indentify the fluctuation in short-term liquidity in the domestic financial market. 9 This might be a reason why the growth rate of M1 showed declining trend, while overall short-term liquidity expanded through the foreign capital inflow and triggered the persistent rise of asset prices.
Therefore, Korea's monetary conditions were not contracted enough to effectively respond to the economic circumstances. Given the increased short-term liquidity through the massive inflow of foreign capital, the upward adjustment of policy interest rate was not enough to be effective to alleviate the upward pressure of asset prices in Korea.
III. The Crisis and the Policy Responses in Korea
A. Global Financial Crisis and Initial Policy Responses in 2008
The reflected in the decline of GDI growth rate, which was faster than that of GDP growth rate impacted by the hike in oil price and thus worsened terms of trade.
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Korea's export, meanwhile, maintained the high growth rate of around 20% until the third quarter of 2008 owing to favorable exports to emerging market economies and an increase in export prices. The negative impact of the won's appreciation on exports has weakened reflecting enhanced quality competitiveness of Korean export goods. 11 However, the current account surplus was on the decline, as the balance of goods account recorded a reduced surplus influenced by the rise in imports due to the rising oil prices and also as the balance of service account recorded a large deficit influenced by the rise in overseas travel with the appreciated Korean won. In particular, the surge in oil price combined with the increase in import of crude oil impaired the current account, which reached a deficit of $14 billion during the first three quarters in 2008 from a surplus of $6 billion in 2007.
As the global financial market was severely strained since September 2008, the Korean economy contracted rapidly. The Korean financial market, which was exposed to the foreign capital relatively more than other emerging markets, was affected more severely, especially the won recorded the sharpest depreciation with the market in panic, while the plunge of Korean stock prices was just as bitter as other markets. Such sensitive reaction of the exchange market was quite unexpected when it is considered that the Korea's foreign reserve surpassed $250 billion as of June 2008. In retrospect, the overreaction was caused by the doubt of market agents over the liquidity of the official foreign reserves in Korea reminding them of the trauma caused during the crisis in 1997 when the liquid assets in its official foreign reserves was almost completely depleted. However, the more fundamental cause appears to be the higher short-term external debt ratio than those of other emerging markets. 10 The depreciation of dollar in the wake of sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US had pushed up the oil and raw material price which already showed upward trend due to the global demand pressure. investment, dragging down the stock and house prices and increasing financing cost. Along with this, the diffusion of the global financial crisis undermined the emerging economies as well as advanced economies, damaging the export demand. Korea as well saw a sharp decline in export and the economy went into recession rapidly.
B. Macroeconomic Policy Responses to the Crisis
In 2009 
C. Expansionary fiscal policy and its consequences
The Korean government responded to the sharp economic downturn resulting from the global financial crisis with a large fiscal stimulus. The expansion in fiscal stimulus package after the second half of 2008 reached 50 trillion won, which accounts for more than 5% of Korea's nominal GDP in 2008. According to OECD (2010), the magnitude of fiscal stimulus package implemented and/or announced by the Korean government to respond to the global financial crisis is 6.1% of GDP, which is the highest among OECD member countries adopting explicit crisis driven stimulus programs. A large fiscal stimulus such as this had made significant contributions to Korea's economic recovery from the severe economic slowdown. However, as the government executed front-loading of fiscal expenditure in the first half of 2009, the capacity to cover the additional fiscal expenditure was weakened, triggering concerns that the Korean economy's recovery might slow down sharply from the second half of 2009.
14 Such concern was rooted from the worry that the growth potential or viability of Korea's private sector was not sufficiently recovered. To examine such concern, it may be necessary to measure the contribution of fiscal stimulus to the recovery of GDP growth rate and figure out the extent of private sector recovery.
14 The Korean government announced that 65% of budget (167 trillion won out of 258 trillion won) was front-loaded in the first half of 2009. Notes: Numbers are the size of growth rate change from the respective baseline Q-to-Q growth rate.
Generally, in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, it is expected that the effect of expanded fiscal expenditure would be realized with some lags. Using the quarterly macroeconomic model of the Korea Development Institute, KDI (2009) simulated the dynamic effects of Korea's fiscal expenditure on GDP for several quarters. 15 The results reported in Table   2 imply that a temporary increase in fiscal expenditure of 1% of annual GDP of Korea (about 10 trillion won) in a certain quarter raises the real GDP growth rate by 0.49%p from the baseline for the same quarter and 0.26%p for the period of 4 quarters, i.e. during the immediately following year after the stimulus. 16 It should be noted that such positive effect of fiscal expenditure will be 15 The numbers in the second row of Table 2 can be considered as the fiscal multiplier. As reported in Spilimbergo et al. (2008) , existing studies provide a wide range of values for the short-term fiscal multiplier from less than zero to larger than four, depending on the identifying assumptions, the type of fiscal policy, and the country of interest. Similarly for Korea, Huh (2007) found that the fiscal multiplier is not significantly different from zero or even negative while most of other studies indicate that the fiscal multiplier is positive but less than 1 as those found in this paper. Hong (2009) suggested that the fiscal multiplier is likely to be larger in the current crisis because the effectiveness of a stimulus package depends on the severity of a recession, especially when there is large slack in the economy. 16 In the model used for the estimation, interest rates are endogenously determined so that an increase in fiscal expenditure leads to upward pressure on interest rates, which partially crowds out the effects on the GDP growth rate. However, as experienced in 2009 and the first half of 2010, when interest rates remains at a low level due to expansionary monetary policy, the effect of fiscal expenditure would be bigger than that shown here. Still, there remains an issue that the leakage of demand through imports and the effects of fiscal expansion on the exchange rate also have the 'crowding-out effect.' weakened after the 5 th quarter and turn out negative in later quarters so that the long-run effect of increase in fiscal expenditure would be negated. Table 2 also shows the effects of increase in fiscal expenditure on other macroeconomic variables.
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To measure the macroeconomic effects of fiscal stimulus package executed since the fourth quarter of 2008, I used the numbers reported in Table 2 as multipliers that can be combined with the temporarily expanded fiscal expenditure due to the discretionary stimulus policy. It is assumed, first, that the entire supplementary budget of 4.6 trillion won determined in Table 3 shows the accumulated contribution of fiscal stimulus executed in each quarter considering the dynamic effect of fiscal expenditure shown by the numbers in the second row of Table 2 . Table 3 indicates that fiscal stimulus had significantly contributed in buffering against a falling growth rate of the Korean economy in the first half of 2009. In other words, the expansion in fiscal expenditure and tax reduction were estimated to uphold the growth rate for the first 17 Numbers in Table 2 quarter of 2009 to increase by 1.2%p and that for the second quarter by 1.8%p. This could also mean that without such fiscal stimulus, the quarter-on-quarter growth rate could have reached only -1.0% in the first quarter and 0.6% in the second quarter. Furthermore, Table 3 shows that the contribution of fiscal stimulus was sustained in the second half of 2009 despite the fiscal expenditure sharply decreasing in the same period. 18 Since then Korea's GDP growth rate has remained above the total contribution of fiscal stimulus, which implies that the recovery pace of demand in the private sector began to accelerate while the effects of fiscal stimulus of 2008 and 2009 were phased out. In particular, exports and domestic demand in the private sector appears to be the lead drivers for stronger recovery, contributing to sustaining the growth of the Korean economy. Therefore, it might be appropriate to conclude that the fiscal stimulus in Korea successfully played its pump-priming role during the crisis.
D. Low interest rate policy and its consequences
After raising its base interest rate (target call rate) to 5. For example, the appropriate de-leveraging in each sector of the Korean economy might have been delayed due to the super-low interest rate policy. In fact, I could not observe any significant debt adjustment of households and companies that can be easily witnessed in advanced economies. As for households, the debt ratio against GDP rose even after the crisis to 80% in 2009, meaning that it would be difficult to exclude the possibility of a growing pressure of repayment and insolvency risks, when the rapid rise in household debt continues, although the possibility of an outbreak of massive default problem is low. As for corporations, the debt ratio against GDP reached above 110%, higher than those of the crisis epicenter countries, meaning that a full-scale de-leveraging is required, centering on loans to SMEs and the construction sector, which posted a sharp rise from 2005.
Despite the excessively loose monetary policy, consumer price inflation has been stabilized, so far. Headline CPI inflation has fallen from a peak of nearly 6% (year-on-year) in mid-2008 to 2% in the third quarter of 2009 ( Figure 10 ). In contrast to the concern on actual or potential deflation, inflation in Korea has stayed above 2%, reflecting, in part, the base effect related to the higher starting point. Such relatively high inflation during the crisis period in Korea also reflects the large depreciation of won, which boosted import prices. Inflation bottomed out at 2% in the third quarter of 2009 and has since picked up while remaining below the mid-point of the inflation target zone. CPI grow th rate
Although the current inflation rate seems to be well stabilized, it is mostly attributable to the stabilization of exchange rate in Korea. In fact, inflationary pressures have been building up with the overall economic recovery and import prices, including crude oil prices, also have continually put an upward pressure. However, Korea's exchange rate flexibility has served well, and the appreciation of Korean won since 2009 have been successfully offsetting the upward inflationary pressures.
IV. Conclusion: Policies to exit from the crisis
Although the proactive fiscal and monetary policy significantly contributed to the recovery from the recent crisis, there have been questions raised of the appropriate timing and speed of the exit from such exceptional macroeconomic policy stances as Korea's strong recovery from the global financial crisis is expected to continue. It is concerned that excessive macroeconomic stimulus implemented during the crisis may bring negative effects, such as asset price bubbles and overheated economy, unless these macroeconomic policies are normalized in a timely manner. Further, to lead the recent economic recovery pace to a stable and steady growth, it has been suggested that macroeconomic policies need to be implemented with their focus on improving the economic efficiency while gradually normalizing contingency measures.
For the fiscal policy, there are continuously arising worries that rapidly expanded fiscal stimulus measures to alleviate the impact of crisis and overcome economic recession could undermine fiscal soundness. In addition, although Korea's fiscal conditions have not yet faced severe situations as in some advanced economies and Korea's government debt, currently around 35% of GDP, seems still manageable, there is still the possibility of growing government debt.
From a long-term perspective, there are several negative factors such as population aging and reunification which poses a threat to Korea's future fiscal soundness.
Considering that the 2010 budget is relatively tight based on the fiscal impulse indicator compared to the budget for 2009, it can be seen that the normalization process in the fiscal policy is already underway. Given the pace of the upturn, the planned withdrawal of fiscal stimulus in 2010 appears to be appropriate, but needs to be followed by more spending restraint compared to the past, centering its policy focus on recovering fiscal soundness. Not only should the temporary measures of fiscal incentives be phased out as scheduled, but also revenue bases need to be expanded such as through lowering tax exemptions. Additional revenue could be obtained by broadening tax bases without worsening distortions. In addition, some structural changes of fiscal policy framework are needed, such as a stricter practice of medium-term budget planning and reduction of discretionary components.
Given Korea's outlook for strong output growth led by private-sector demand, the Bank of Korea should start to withdraw monetary policy of super-low interest rate to keep inflation firmly anchored at its current level of 3%. While there is uncertainty, it is important not to let inflationary expectations and pressures build for too long, making it important to begin withdrawing monetary stimulus. Such pre-emptive action would avoid another run-up in inflation, which would likely require a significant tightening that could undermine the expansion.
There are still concerns that should be mentioned. It should be also noted that to normalize the current super-low interest rate would take a considerable amount of time. On the other side, a sudden upward adjustment of policy interest rates could bring unnecessary burdens to the recovery. Therefore, as a way to normalized the current macroeconomic policy stances at a gradual pace, it seems natural to start the adjustment of interest rate before the potential side effects are realized. In other words, now is the time to start steering the monetary policy towards a stable growth.
Meanwhile, it is also necessary to discuss the international spillover effect of the change in macroeconomic policy stance. That is, as policy change in a nation can significantly impact on other countries through trade and financial channels, a certain degree of international cooperation may be required. In particular, implementing an exit strategy without considering such spillover effects is likely to bring about an unexpected negative impact on the global demand which will then hinder stable recovery of the global economy. Reflecting these possibilities, world leaders in the G20 Summit reached an agreement on the principles of the global cooperation in implementing exit strategy, but no unified restrictions were made to determine the time schedule and the scale of exit strategy of each country.
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Therefore, specific exit strategies could be different, depending on the country, in terms of the implementation time and scale. It is necessary for each country to recognize the need for independent policy which is made to fit the unique conditions of each country such as the independent decision making of central banks relating to the raise in the policy interest rates.
Nevertheless, in order for each government to carry out correct policies, accurately understanding the global economic conditions is of great significance. In that sense, the sharing of information on macroeconomic conditions and policy stance among countries is particularly important in terms of global cooperation.
